Agency Attorney Prosecuting Case Should Not Also Be in Position of Advising The Agency; Possible Bias Denies Due Process

McAlpin appealed an order of the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) suspending his law enforcement certification for eighteen months. The Commission filed an administrative complaint alleging misconduct during the course of a criminal investigation. A formal administrative hearing was held and a recommended order was issued.

At the Commission hearing to consider the recommended order, the attorney who prosecuted the case against McAlpin was present and offered advice to the Commission. The Commission’s staff had prepared a memorandum to the Commission recommending an increase in the recommended penalty to revocation of McAlpin’s license. It was not clear who prepared the staff memorandum. However, it was clear the prosecuting attorney had prepared exceptions to the recommended order for the agency.

On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for a new Commission hearing. While the Commission did not ultimately adopt the agency’s recommendation of an increased penalty, the court held that the staff attorney’s enhanced access to the Commission undermined the Commission’s function as an unbiased reviewer of the recommended order.

The court did note that it was not inherently inappropriate to consolidate investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory authority in a single agency. Each case must be considered on its unique factual background.

Source:

McAlpin v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Comm’n, 120 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)(Opinion filed September 13, 2013).

About the Author: The forgoing case summary was prepared by Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire, of the Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar. It originally appeared in the Administrative Law Section newsletter, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Dec. 2013).

 

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If Denial of Licensure is Disciplinary in Nature, Then Agency Must Prove Case by “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

The foregoing case summary was prepared by Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire, of The Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar.

Davis Family Day Care Home (“Davis”) was issued a license as a family day care home in 2007. Davis applied annually for renewal of that license. In 2011, Davis applied for renewal of its license and also applied for a license as a large family child care home.

The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) proposed to deny both the renewal application and the application for licensure as a large family child care home. Davis sought an administrative hearing on both denials. After an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a recommended order recommending issuance of the renewal on a probationary basis and issuance of the large family child care home application on a provisional basis. The ALJ held that the burden of proof for the license denial was clear and convincing evidence. DCF rejected that conclusion, and provided a substituted conclusion of law that the burden of proof was by competent substantial evidence. DCF adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to renew the family day care home on a probationary basis, but denied the application for a large family child care home license.

On appeal, the court reversed and remanded. It held that DCF had misused the appellate “competent substantial evidence” standard of review as the burden of proof.

With respect to the appropriate burden on DCF, the court held that DCF must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the license should be denied, and not by a preponderance of the evidence. The court opined that the denial of the license for a large family child care home was essentially a disciplinary action since it was predicated on violations allegedly committed under the day care home license. The statute relied on by DCF authorized imposition of “disciplinary sanctions,” including denial or revocation of a license, for violations of the licensing laws. The court noted that DCF itself had acknowledged the disciplinary nature of its action, referring to its initial decision letter as an “administrative complaint.”

While recognizing that the court in Department of Banking and Finance v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2006), had applied the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof (instead of clear and convincing evidence) to license application proceedings, the court noted that section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., had been amended since the Osborne decision. Section 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat., now provides that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies except in penal or disciplinary actions. In this case, the statute made clear that DCF was taking disciplinary action.

Source:

Davis Family Day Care v. Department of Children and Family Servs., 117 So. 3d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (Opinion filed July 17, 2013).

About the Author: The foregoing case summary was prepared by Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire, of The Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar. It originally appeared in the Administrative Law Section newsletter, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Dec. 2013).

 

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